NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 9010040140
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 PAGE: 1 OF 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000336

TITLE: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
EVENT DATE: 08/27/90 LER #: 90-012-00 REPORT DATE: 09/26/90

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000

OPERATING MODE: POWER LEVEL: 100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION:
50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:
NAME: Gary E. Komosky, Engineer, Ext. 4725 TELEPHONE: (203) 447-1791

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:
CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:
REPORTABLE NPRDS:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

On August 27, 1990, at 0100, with the reactor plant in MODE 1 (100% power, 575 degrees F, 2263 psig), while performing Surveillance Procedure SP 2601D "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration" with 'A' RPS (Reactor Protection System) channel inoperable (tripped), the plant operator did not bypass the second channel before testing it, which caused an automatic plant trip. Operators then performed Emergency Operating Procedure EOP 2-25, "Standard Post Trip Actions". All equipment responded as expected and the unit was placed in a stable condition. The cause of the event was operator error in that the operator failed to perform the prescribed steps when initiating the daily, Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration. The licensed Reactor Operator involved has been instructed in the proper sequence of bypass switch operations and the entire Operations Department has discussed the importance of evaluating plant conditions and self-verification at subsequent department meetings. In addition, procedure SP 2601D has been revised to incorporate a separate section on

performing, the calibrations with one RPS channel inoperable, including a signature requirement for verification that the bypass lights are energized on the channel to be tested. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv), reporting any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety, Feature System.

Similar LER'S: None.

END OF ABSTRACT

I. Description of Event

On August, 27, 1990, at 0100, with the reactor plant in MODE 1 (100% power. 575 degrees F, 2263 psig,), while performing daily surveillance procedure, SP 2601D "Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration" with 'A' RPS (Reactor Protection System channel inoperable (tripped), the plant operator did not bypass the second channel before testing it, which caused an automatic plant trip. Operators then performed Emergency Operating Procedure EOP 2525, "Standard Post Trip Actions". All equipment responded as expected and the unit was placed in a stable condition.

Channel 'A' of the RPS was inoperable due to a failure which occurred in the evening of August 26, 1990. Repairs to the failed circuits were in progress. The Unit's Technical Specifications (TS) permit continued operation at full power with one channel of the RPS out of service, as long, as specified actions are taken in accordance with the TS. Early in the morning of August 27, 1990, the licensed operator prepared to conduct daily surveillance testing of the three operable RPS channels. As required by the TS, he made preparations for the test by manually inserting trip signals on the affected circuits of Channel 'A'. He then placed the bypass keys in the appropriate modules of the first channel to be tested, and informed supervision that he was about to begin the test. He then performed the first test step without turning the bypass keys to the bypass position. This resulted in a trip condition in Channel 'B' power-related trip circuits. Since Channel 'A' trip circuits were already in a tripped condition, the two-out-of-four coincidence logic of the RPS was satisfied, and the RPS automatically tripped the reactor.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of the event was operator error in that the operator failed to perform the prescribed steps when initiating the daily Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration. Unusual plant conditions, i.e., one channel of the RPS inoperable and in a tripped condition, contributed to the event since the operator error would not have caused a reactor trip if all four channels of the RPS had been operable.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv), reporting any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature System.

There were no safety consequences from this reactor trip. All plant systems functioned as designed to restore the unit to a stable condition. All equipment responded as expected and plant operators executed applicable Emergency Operating, Procedures accordingly.

IV. Corrective Action

Emergency Operating Procedure EOP 2525, "Standard Post Trip Actions" was completed satisfactorily. All safety equipment responded as designed. The
perator who caused the trip was instructed in the
proper use and verification of procedural steps; the shift on duty was reminded of the importance of self-verification techniques; and the Operations Manager discussed the importance of evaluation, plant conditions and using self-verification, at Operations Department meetings held on August 30, 1990.

As action to prevent recurrence, the procedure for conducting the Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration has been revised to incorporate a separate section on performing the calibrations with one RPS channel inoperable, including, a signature requirement for verification that the bypass lights are energized on the channel to be tested.

Additional Information

There were no failed components.

Similar LER's: None

EIIS Code Identifiers:

JC-TBLK-C490

ATTACHMENT 1 TO 9010040140 PAGE 1 OF 1

NORTHWEST UTILITIES
The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices Selden Street Berlin Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06414-0270
(203) 665-5000

September 26, 1990
MP-90-1053
Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-36
Licensee Event Report 90-012-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 90-012-00 required to be submitted within thirty, (30) days pursuant to paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv), reporting any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature System.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Stephen E. Scace

SES/GK:mo

Attachment: LER 90-102-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1. 2 and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

*** END OF DOCUMENT ***